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Summary 
The amount of aid that flows to ‘Middle Income Countries’ (MICs) has recently been challenged and 
some donors are shifting the balance of their aid so that more goes to poorer countries. Is there still a role 
for aid to MICs and what should that role be? Drawing on cases from the Andean region and Jamaica, this 
paper seeks to contribute to that debate within the current context of the Millennium Aid Consensus and 
the new ways of working that include greater emphasis on country ownership and programmatic and 
budget support. It concludes that, as aid as a proportion of GDP is usually modest in MICs, donors have 
little direct leverage. Necessarily the role of aid must be to support the agenda of those local actors, 
government or otherwise, who are working for the kind of change that a donor judges worthwhile. 
If a ‘Middle Income Country’ has a track record of rapid improvement in the welfare of its 
population, aid may primarily be justified to speed things up. Conversely, if no or little progress is being 
made, aid may be justified because of the very lack of progress in poverty reduction that may be due to 
deep structural inequalities and exclusion of much of the population. In this latter case it is suggested that 
great care should be taken to ensure that commercial and political interests of the donor government do 
not undermine the aid effort. 
Good aid practice also needs to take account of the diversity among MICs, bearing in mind that the 
classification system is very arbitrary, not locally owned and not integrated into regional or sub-regional 
considerations and history. The paper concludes by questioning some of the current conventional 
assumptions about the cost and benefits of donor coherence and coordination.  
 iv 
 
 v 
Contents 
 Summary  iii 
 List of tables and boxes vi 
 Preface  vii 
 Acronyms  ix 
1 Introduction 1 
2 The Millennium Aid Consensus 2 
 2.1 What is the consensus? 2 
 2.2 Is it relevant to MICs? 3 
3 Defining MICs (choosing a view of the world) 4 
 3.1 The OECD DAC classification 5 
  3.1.1 What counts as aid 5 
  3.1.2 The DAC classification 6 
  3.1.3 Aid dependence 7 
 3.2 Alternative criteria and anomalies 7 
  3.2.1 The World Bank classification 7 
  3.2.2 The Human Development Index 8 
 3.3 Development as graduation 8 
 3.4 Practical consequences of classification 9 
 3.5 Possible sub-groupings 10 
4 Why aid agencies are/should be interested in MICs 11 
 4.1 Introduction 11 
 4.2 Supporting the reduction of inequality and social exclusion 12 
 4.3 International public goods arguments 15 
 4.4 Whose power, whose voice, whose knowledge in the relationship? 17 
5 Good practice for aid to MICs 18 
 5.1 Institutional framework for aid management in MICs 18 
  5.1.1 General considerations 18 
  5.1.2 Country examples 19 
 5.2 Aid agency choices 23 
  5.2.1 Choosing beneficiary countries 23 
  5.2.2 Aid channels 23 
  5.2.3 Lessons for effective aid to MICs 24 
 5.3 Bilateral-multilateral relationships 25 
  5.3.1 General issues 25 
  5.3.2 Country examples 27 
6 Conclusion and further issues 28 
 6.1 Issues for further exploration 30 
 Annex A: Classifications of ‘Middle Incomes Countries’ 32 
 References 38 
 
 vi 
Tables 
Table A1 Discrepancies between DAC bands and World Bank MIC classification 33 
Table A2 Asymmetries between income and HD grading 2003 34 
Table A3 DAC, World Bank and HDR classifications 2003 35 
 
Boxes 
Box 3.1  Concessional and non-concessional development finance from IFIs 5 
Box 3.2  DAC classification of aid recipients 6 
Box 3.3  Income status transitions since 1980 7 
Box 4.1  Unpacking the meanings given to inequality in development practice 13 
Box 4.2  MICs’ interest in the international financial architecture 16 
Box 5.1  Four LAC country aid profiles 20 
Box 5.2  Relevant factors for choice of aid channels to support poverty reduction in MICs 24 
Box 6.1  Relevance to the role of aid in MICs of lessons learnt from the CDF evaluation 29 
 
 
 
 vii 
Preface 
Rosalind Eyben and Stephen Lister were commissioned to write this paper by the British and Spanish aid 
agencies (Department for International Development (DFID) and Spanish Agency for International 
Cooperation (Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional) (AECI) ) with a contribution from Iliana Olivié. 
An earlier version was used as a background document to inform AECI/DFID visits to Bolivia, 
Colombia, Peru and Jamaica by Ben Dickinson, Luis Tejada and Iliana Olivié. This published version 
incorporates findings from those visits. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those 
of DFID or of the AECI. 
The authors are grateful to Howard White and Stephen McCarthy for comments on earlier drafts. 
 
 
 
 viii 
 ix 
Acronyms 
  
AECI Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (Agencia Española de Cooperación 
Internacional) 
AfDB African Development Bank 
AsDB Asian Development Bank 
CAF Corporación Andina de Fomento [Andean Development Fund] 
CDF Comprehensive Development Framework  
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency 
CSO Civil Society Organisation 
DAC (OECD) Development Assistance Committee  
DFID Department for International Development  
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
EC European Commission 
ECLAC  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
ESCAP  Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
EU European Union 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FSU Former Soviet Union 
GNI Gross National Income 
GNP Gross National Product 
HDI Human Development Index 
HIC High Income Country 
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Country 
IADB Inter-American Development Bank  
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
IDA International Development Association  
IDB Inter-American Development Bank  
IFA International Financial Architecture 
IFI International Financial Institution  
IMF International Monetary Fund 
I-PRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  
LAC Latin America and Caribbean 
LDC Least Developed Country 
LIC Low Income Country 
LICUS Low Income Country Under Stress 
 x 
LMIC Lower Middle-Income Country  
MDB Multilateral Development Bank  
MDG Millennium Development Goal  
MIC ‘Middle Income Country’ 
MTSEF Medium Term Social and Economic Framework 
NGO Non Governmental Organisation  
OA Official Assistance 
ODA  Official Development Assistance  
ODF Official Development Finance 
ODI Overseas Development Institute  
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  
SWAp Sector Wide Approach  
TA Technical Assistance 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme  
UNECA  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa  
UMIC Upper Middle-Income Country  
USAID United States Agency for International Development  
WB World Bank  
 
 
1 
1  Introduction 
The ‘Millennium Aid Consensus’ – which we characterise in Section 2 below – has involved a stronger 
focus on poverty, and hence on the poorest countries. A number of bilateral aid agencies have sought to 
increase the share of aid going to the poorest countries, with a corresponding decline in the share of 
funding available for ‘Middle Income Countries’ (MICs). New ways of working in the poorest countries 
are centred on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) with growing prominence for programme-
based approaches such as Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) and budget support, and greater emphasis on 
harmonisation amongst donors. This has left aid agencies wondering how they should treat aid recipients 
who are not among the poorest countries. What is the rationale for aid to so-called MICs? And do the 
emerging rules of good aid practice apply to MICs in the same way as they do to Low Income Countries 
(LICs)? 
The British and Spanish aid agencies (DFID and AECI) have agreed a joint programme of work to 
explore the role of aid in MICs, and to discuss and share the issues raised with other European Union 
(EU) member states, partners in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the multilateral agencies. The present paper was 
originally commissioned by DFID and the AECI as a background discussion piece to identify the 
parameters of this theme, considering, inter alia, the applicability to MICs of the assistance framework 
developed for Low Income Countries. 
As part of the same exercise, in late 2003 AECI and DFID conducted joint exploratory visits to 
Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Jamaica to see how aid operates in a sample of Western Hemisphere MICs. 
The visits were limited in scale, but through discussions with governments, official aid agencies, NGOs 
and civil society organisations, they investigated some of the issues raised in an earlier, unpublished 
version of this paper (Eyben, Lister and Olivié 2003). The informal reports from the country visits have 
helped to sharpen and illustrate some of our original points, but also highlighted some additional features 
which are reflected in this revised and reorganised draft. In particular, they reinforced our attention to the 
institutional framework for aid relationships. 
However, the paper remains a think-piece – designed as much to stimulate further thought as to 
propose particular conclusions. Our country examples are biased towards Latin America and the 
Caribbean, but MICs are heterogeneous and one of the follow-up tasks should be to explore whether the 
same issues are salient in the ‘Middle Income Countries’ of other regions. 
The paper is organised as follows: 
 
• Section 2 characterises the Millennium Aid Consensus and its implications for aid practice. Noting 
that the consensus focuses especially on poorer countries, we consider prima facie ways in which 
MICs might require different approaches/behaviour, and this provides the agenda of issues explored 
in the rest of the paper. 
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• Section 3 considers the definition of MICs. We note anomalies and confusions that can arise from 
different approaches to classification; we also explore conceptual and practical issues surrounding 
“graduation” from one level to another. 
• Section 4 reviews the reasons (in principle and in practice) why aid agencies are involved with MICs. 
We note that actual motives are complex, and that aid agencies’ behaviour is strongly influenced by 
their different histories, mandates, interests and ways of working. We also discuss issues of inequality 
and power relations as they relate to MICs. 
• Section 5 discusses good practice for aid to MICs. We highlight ways in which the aid environment 
may differ from LICs and explore the implications for aid agency choices.  
• Section 6 offers our general conclusions and proposes issues for further study. 
 
2  The Millennium Aid Consensus  
 
2.1 What is the consensus? 
Key elements of the Millennium Aid Consensus are: 
 
• Focus on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This in turn implies recognition (a) that poverty 
matters, (b) that poverty has many dimensions, and (c) that growth per se is not an adequate answer to 
poverty. 
• Belief that aid can be effective if the institutional and policy context is right. Hence: (a) a focus on policy reform, 
institutional development and capacity building, and (b) arguments for concentrating resources on 
good performers. (At the same time, the problem of countries that are both poor and poor 
performers is addressed under headings such as LICUS.1) 
• A set of aid management principles to which the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) label is 
often attached.2 These stress the importance of donors building on (a) the country’s development 
vision and agenda, (b) a systematic and comprehensive diagnosis, and (c) an informed view of what 
others – including the private sector – are doing.3 
• Attention to aid effectiveness. In particular, recognition that traditional modes of aid delivery – 
uncoordinated projects managed outside of government systems – have been unsustainable, have 
imposed unnecessary costs on government, and have undermined the development of government 
capacity, at least in aid dependent countries. Hence there are pressures for harmonisation among 
                                                   
1  Low Income Countries Under Stress. 
2  When the CDF was launched there was much emphasis on drawing up a CDF matrix as a tool for managing 
and monitoring different stakeholders’ roles in supporting different aspects of development. The emphasis now 
is on the underlying principles that inspired the matrix. The PRSP is itself seen as an embodiment of CDF 
principles. Thus, while it is straightforward to identify countries that do and don’t have PRSPs, it no longer 
makes sense to ask whether countries do or do not have a CDF. 
3  This particular characterisation is taken from the World Bank’s MIC task force report (World Bank 2001). 
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donors, stress on using and strengthening government systems, and advocacy for non-project 
approaches to aid, including Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) and budget support. 
• Aid as part of a wider international system: acknowledgement that aid should be part of wider efforts to 
establish a more favourable global economic and policy environment for poverty reduction. 
 
The organisational expression of the consensus, and increasingly the paradigm for government-donor 
relations, is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process. In principle, this stresses in-country 
development of pro-poor strategies in ways that increase the influence of local actors outside government. 
It facilitates coordination of donors around a nationally-owned and coherent set of macro and sector 
policies. It requires the articulation of structures for dialogue between government and the donor 
community, makes transparent the targets and indicators on which they agree to focus, and brings policy, 
institutional and capacity-building issues to the fore.  
The PRSP paradigm has direct implications for the way in which donors should manage their 
individual aid programmes and for their relations with each other and with recipient countries. In 
particular it calls for a high degree of coordination among donors (working jointly with government) in 
each phase of aid management, from situation analysis (poverty, institutional framework, policy 
requirements) to aid delivery (at least: coordinated projects within common sector and macro strategies; at 
best: orchestrated budget support), to monitoring (of institutional quality, fiduciary standards, inputs, 
outputs, outcomes and poverty impacts).  
 
2.2 Is it relevant to MICs? 
It is not our purpose to review the validity of the whole Millennium Aid Consensus. However, it does 
appear to represent a significant re-write of the “rules of the game” (Craig and Porter 2003) and as such it 
raises some urgent questions for aid agencies. Notably: 
 
• Given the emphasis on poverty reduction, what are the justifications for aid to MICs?  
• Are the preferred aid instruments and aid management frameworks for Low Income Countries 
relevant for MICs? For example: 
– Is the PRSP approach appropriate? If the whole package is not appropriate or feasible, 
should parts of the approach nevertheless be used? For example, is it still important to 
have a common strategic focus? Should agencies share analytical work? Does joint 
analysis constrain possibilities for recipient governments to be offered the choice of 
different approaches to complex problems? 
– Are problems of burdens imposed by donor practices more or less serious in MICs? 
Does poorly designed aid have de-capacitating effects even when aid volumes are low? 
– If messages about country ownership and coherence among donors are relevant in 
MICs, what (in the absence of formal PRSP disciplines) are the incentives for donors 
to act coherently? Are MIC governments interested or concerned about donor 
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coherence or the lack of it? Is ownership less or more of an issue in countries where 
governments do not perceive themselves as aid dependent? 
– How should the aid management framework take account of the greater relative 
importance of non-concessional flows (including those provided by agencies – notably 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) – that can provide both)? 
– What are the implications for balance between different types of agency 
(bilateral/multilateral etc)? What are the comparative advantages of multilateral 
development banks (MDBs), other multilaterals and bilaterals, and what does this 
imply about the optimal channelling of aid? 
– Are global programmes of greater relative importance, and if so what are the 
implications for aid effectiveness and coherence? 
• How serious are problems of diversity in donor aims? (In particular, for how many MIC donors is 
poverty reduction really the primary consideration?) Is aid to MICs more vulnerable to being shaped 
by non-MDG concerns of both donor and recipient governments?  
• To what extent is aid to MICs primarily about addressing real fiscal constraints as distinct from 
deploying human and financial resources to support innovation and piloting by discrete sections 
within government and civil society?  
• How serious are divergences between government and donor concerns about poverty? Are issues 
about working with civil society, on advocacy etc, more important in MICs, and/or do they require 
different approaches? How important are (international and local) non-government channels for aid? 
Do donors engage effectively with the (presumably) richer array of Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOs), academics etc in MICs? 
 
These are big issues for a small paper! As we discuss in the next section, MICs are heterogeneous and the 
LIC/MIC classification is a continuum, so we have to be wary of over-generalisation. On the other hand, 
as we consider in our conclusion, while these questions have no easy answer there are emerging examples 
of good practice that can inform the debate and clarify negotiations over aid policies and programmes. 
 
3  Defining MICs (choosing a view of the world) 
MICs are defined differently by different agencies and in different contexts. (Annex A compares 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), World Bank and United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) classifications in detail.) Definitions matter for both practical and conceptual reasons. Practically: 
(a) different definitions yield very different country groupings, and generalisations about MICs are hostage 
to the particular definition used; and (b) arbitrary thresholds between one category and another can have 
significant effects for the countries that are borderline. Conceptually, different classification criteria have 
different policy implications, while the idea of graduating countries from one level to another may reflect 
questionable theories of development. In this section we take the DAC’s definition of aid and its 
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classification of aid recipients as a starting point. We then contrast this with the alternative classifications 
used by the World Bank and in the UNDP Human Development Reports. We critically examine the 
concept of “graduation”, and, finally, we illustrate some of the practical consequences for countries which 
find themselves on the border between LIC and MIC classification. 
 
3.1 The OECD DAC classification 
 
3.1.1 What counts as aid 4 
OECD DAC defines aid on the basis of (a) the developmental purpose of the flow; (b) a grant 
equivalence of 25 per cent or more; (c) developing country status of the recipient. The DAC list of aid 
recipients is divided into two parts: the “traditional” developing countries in Part I and “more advanced” 
Eastern European and developing countries in Part II. Only aid to Part I countries counts as Official 
Development Assistance (ODA); aid to Part II countries is classified as Official Aid (OA). Official 
Development Finance includes ODA, plus non-concessional lending by MDBs, plus other official 
development flows that have too low a grant equivalent to qualify as ODA. 
These wider categories (OA and ODF) are important for MICs because many MICs are on the 
Part II list, and non-concessional lending by MDBs is often an important component of development 
financing in MICs (as well as being the dominant business of several regional MDBs – see Box 3.1). 
 
Box 3.1 Concessional and non-concessional development finance from IFIs 
Gross disbursements 
2002 a 
Concessional Non-
concessional 
Total Concessional Non-
concessional 
 $ million, at current prices and exchange rates percentages 
World Bank (IDA/IBRD/IFC) 6,923 9,789 16,712 41% 59% 
IMF b 2,936  2,936 100% 0% 
AsDB/AsDF 1,168 3,067 4,235 28% 72% 
AfDB/AfDF 741 679 1,420 52% 48% 
IDB 425 5,508 5,933 7% 93% 
Caribbean Dev. Bank 113 108 221 51% 49% 
EBRD 44 627 671 7% 93% 
Total IFIs 12,350 19,778 32,128 38% 62% 
 
(a) To countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients. 
(b) IMF Trust Fund and PRGF. 
Source: OECD DAC (2003: Table 17). 
                                                   
4  See Annex A for the full DAC definitions of ODA, OA and ODF. 
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3.1.2 The DAC classification  
Box 3.2 shows the DAC classification of aid recipients, incorporating its definition of MICs as those 
whose per capita incomes range between $746 and $9,205.5 MICs are subdivided into Lower and Upper 
MIC brackets. 
 
Box 3.2 DAC classification of aid recipients 
Category Income range  
(per capita GNI in 2001) 
Part I: Developing countries and territories (Official Development Assistance) 
1. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) Poverty is a major criterion but not the only 
one for LDC status 
2.Other Low Income Countries (LICs) <$745  
3. Lower ‘Middle Income Countries’ (LMICs) $746–$2,975 
4. Upper ‘Middle Income Countries’ (UMICs) $2,976–$9,205 
5. High Income Countries (HICs) >$9,206 
Part II: Countries and territories in transition (Official Aid) 
6. Central and Eastern European countries 
and New Independent States of the former 
Soviet Union 
In practice, some of the transition countries 
appear in Part I of the DAC classification. 
Most, but not all, of the Part II countries are 
in the middle income ranges. 
7. More Advanced Developing Countries and 
Territories 
 
 
The classification of countries into high, middle and low income groups is bound to be somewhat 
arbitrary. Leaving aside the problems of income concepts and their measurement in ways that are 
internationally comparable, it is worth noting: 
 
• Various deliberate anomalies, including: 
– Some countries qualify as LDCs on non-income grounds: at least half a dozen of the 
LDCs listed – mostly small island states – are MICs on the pure income criterion. 
– An important group of European and former Soviet Union MICs are classified 
separately by the DAC as recipients of Official Aid rather than Official Development 
Assistance (ODA). Of these Ukraine is on the border between low and middle 
income categories. (But a number of the central European and former Soviet states do 
appear in the ODA category – see Annex A.) 
• The large range within brackets: the per capita income at the top of the LMIC range is four times the 
MIC threshold, and the top of the UMIC range is over 12 times the threshold. 
                                                   
5  These particular income thresholds, with adjustments for inflation, have persisted since they were first 
introduced into the World Bank’s operational guidelines as a basis for determining eligibility for IDA and 
IBRD lending. However, as noted below, other factors than income are involved in determining this eligibility. 
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• Volatility: country movements from one category to another (in either direction) can make a big 
difference to aggregate data. Annex A shows that three countries – Georgia, Papua New Guinea and 
Uzbekistan – were relegated from MIC to LIC status between 2001 and 2003. Two were promoted – 
Honduras, population 6.6m, and China, population 1.3bn. Also, as Box 3.3 illustrates, several 
countries have oscillated between LIC and MIC status, while a larger number have slipped from MIC 
to LIC without returning. 
 
Box 3.3 Income status transitions since 1980 
Over the last 20 years 38 countries have fallen back from MIC to LIC status, with only 10 managing to return 
to MIC status in subsequent years: 
Movement No of countries  Examples 
MIC to LIC without 
return 
21 
Angola, Azerbaijan, Ghana, Kenya, Yemen, Nicaragua, 
Tajikistan, Nigeria, Moldova . . . 
MIC to LIC to MIC 9 China, Egypt, Guyana, Maldives, Turkmenistan, Armenia . . . 
MIC to LIC to MIC to 
LIC 
6 Georgia, Indonesia, Lesotho, Togo, Senegal . . . 
MIC to LIC to MIC to 
LIC to MIC 
1 Albania 
MIC to LIC to MIC to 
LIC to MIC to LIC 
1 Sudan 
 
Source: From [DFID: Annex A Strategy for Achieving the MDGs: The ‘Middle Income Countries’] based on 
World Bank data. 
 
3.1.3 Aid dependence 
Aid dependence is conventionally defined in terms of the ratio of aid to GDP (a measure of country 
dependence), or of aid to public expenditure (a measure of the government’s dependence). The 
significance of aid relative to other resources clearly has implications for aid providers’ ability to influence 
policies and resource allocations of the recipient, as well as for the possible collateral burdens of aid to the 
recipient (possible burdens include the direct transaction costs of managing aid as well as adverse effects 
on the integrity of public expenditure management and government capacity). Less tangibly, but no less 
important, aid dependence may be a state of mind or pattern of behaviour: some countries that receive a 
lot of aid are nevertheless jealous of their sovereignty. Much discussion about aid and MICs conflates two 
attributes that are only somewhat correlated – higher income levels and lower aid dependence. For many 
MICs, non-concessional development finance may be more significant than ODA. 
 
3.2 Alternative criteria and anomalies 
 
3.2.1 The World Bank classification 
The World Bank Task Force on ‘Middle Income Countries’ defines as MICs all those countries which are 
eligible for (or restricted to) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and 
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IBRD/IDA (International Development Association) blend financing.6 Although the DAC and World 
Bank use the same income thresholds, IDA eligibility is determined by a mix of economic and political 
factors. A number of LICs are excluded, on the grounds that they have access to international capital 
markets. (Consistent with this perspective, the WB MIC task force considered classifying MICs – defined 
in terms of IBRD/IDA eligibility – into low, medium and high capital access countries.7 )  
This approach – which makes good sense from the World Bank’s management standpoint – includes 
Azerbaijan, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe – all Low 
Income Countries – into the WB definition of MICs, while ‘Middle Income Countries’ that are still eligible 
for IDA funding – Albania, Guyana, Honduras, Sri Lanka and Tonga – are excluded. (Table A1 in Annex 
A shows the all the discrepancies between World Bank and DAC classifications.) 
Different classifications and promotions/relegations make huge differences to the generalisations 
that can be made about MICs (hardly surprising, since the “swing” countries include India, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan and China). 
Further big differences to the headline data about MICs can come from taking the US$2 per day 
instead of the US$1 per day definition of poverty. White argues for the latter. Although the $2 a day line 
allows the line to increase with income, thus providing for a relative view of poverty that accords with 
nationally generated perceptions of the problem, he suggests that nevertheless it would not be appropriate 
for aid management purposes because it would be setting a moving target (2000: 5). On the other hand, as 
discussed later in this paper, if we consider the purpose of aid to be not necessarily or solely to meet fiscal 
gaps but also to support internal processes of change, then other, nationally generated measurements of 
poverty may well be appropriate. 
 
3.2.2 The Human Development Index 
UNDP’s Human Development Reports rank countries (high, medium and low human development) 
according to a composite Human Development Index. Annex A (Table A2) compares Gross National 
Income (GNI) and HDI rankings; there are many cases where a country’s HDI grade is higher than its 
income grade. A working assumption might be that such countries have higher technical capacity than 
their income peers. 
 
3.3 Development as graduation 
There are also more fundamental issues here, not only as to whether per capita income is the best way to 
encapsulate “levels of development” but also whether it is appropriate to visualise development as a 
process of graduation from lower to higher steps on a development escalator. The World Bank and DAC 
                                                   
6  Other MDBs also classify their borrowers in similar fashion. For example, Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) classifies Jamaica as ‘C’ in a scale running from ‘A’ (the richest IADB borrowers) to ‘D’ (the poorest). 
This classification, combined with the poverty-focus of a loan, determines the proportion of counterpart funds 
IADB expects from borrowers. 
7  See Table 5 in Middle Income Countries: Development Challenges and Growing Global Role, Peter Fallon, Vivian Hon, 
Zia Qureshi and Dilip Ratha, World Bank, August 2001.  
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do this on the basis of national income; the UNDP on the basis of the level of the composite human 
development index. The assumption underlying both systems is that of linear progress from a lower to a 
higher stage of development. Some countries, for example in East Asia, do appear to have followed that 
trajectory, but many have not (as illustrated in Box 3.3 above). 
This way of understanding the world envisions a final stage of maturity, exemplified by the older 
members of the OECD and places ‘Middle Income Countries’ in some uneasy adolescence. As they grow 
up dependency on adults will diminish and a relationship on more equal terms will be established. For 
example, Swedish development policy states that cooperation should gradually evolve into more equal 
political, trade and cultural relations (Government of Sweden 2003). The World Bank notes that the 
experience gained in ‘Middle Income Countries’ can inform the advisory and knowledge base for the Bank 
work in low income countries. 
This concept of development is so ingrained that it has become “natural”. In other words, we find it 
difficult to imagine that we can look at the world any other way. The quandary concerning the role of aid 
in ‘Middle Income Countries’ derives from this “natural” perspective. An alternative view would be to 
think of development as a complex process that cannot be predicted based on the history of one particular 
group of countries (the founding members of the OECD). We should avoid the implicit historicism which 
assumes that a particular sequence of events at a specific moment in time is replicable in other places and 
times (Williams 1983: 146–8; Rist 2002: 74–5).  
Changes at the national and international level may occur in sudden and unexpected ways and may 
not necessarily lead to improvements in people’s well-being. Improvement is neither inevitable nor 
systematic and there are no universally applicable recipes for its sustained achievement. This alternative 
view allows us to reconsider the role of aid from rich countries to poorer countries, recognising that the 
size of their GNP, or even their human development ranking, is only one element that should influence 
decisions as to how best to support efforts by people in these countries to move out of poverty. It could 
encourage a donor government to take a more explicit relational approach with other countries in the 
world and ask how, in collaboration with others, it should best support poverty reduction efforts 
 
3.4 Practical consequences of classification 
Classification systems also have non-trivial practical consequences. Marginal changes in a country’s 
circumstances can lead to non-marginal changes in its aid environment. For example, Bolivia hovers on 
the LIC/MIC borderline; it is in danger of losing access to IDA, but unable to service non-concessional 
borrowing. This creates uncertainty for the Bolivian government, and transaction costs for World Bank 
staff in making special pleadings to preserve IDA access. If MDBs withdraw because they can no longer 
provide ODA and there is no effective demand for  non-concessional finance,  they may cease  to provide 
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analytical work on which bilaterals habitually draw (the World Bank’s disengagement from Jamaica was 
cited by bilateral donors there).8 A major concern in the WB MIC task force report was that countries may 
still want their technical advice, but not the borrowing that usually finances it. 
Crossing the threshold from LIC to MIC creates a decision point that can throw light on the 
different motivations and interests of different stakeholders. DFID has blended some of its aid to China 
with World Bank loans, to soften their terms back to IDA equivalence. The Chinese government prefers 
not to borrow for the social sectors, but DFID’s concerns for poverty reduction have led it to change the 
financial incentives the government faces. (One of DFID’s arguments is that graduation applies to a whole 
country that still contains many poor regions.) This is agreeable to the World Bank, since it enhances the 
breadth as well as the volume of its China portfolio. 
Overall LIC/MIC spending targets may also be arbitrary and will have unpredictable consequences if 
applied rigidly. (E.g. if populous countries graduate, the share of spend for poor people in MICs will be 
arbitrarily reduced unless the headline target is adjusted.) 
 
3.5 Possible sub-groupings 
Unless otherwise specified, our references to MICs are based on the DAC classification. At the same time, 
one should be aware that much of the discussion about aid and MICs conflates two attributes that are 
only somewhat correlated – higher income levels and lower aid dependence. We hope context will make it 
clear which defining characteristic is uppermost in our thoughts in what follows. 
It is clear that the countries involved are very diverse – in population, geography, culture, history, 
HDI scores and indeed income. When and for what purposes does it make sense to consider MICs as a 
group? It largely depends on why the classification is wanted: 
 
(a) Is the classification for analysis, for determining aid eligibility, or as a basis for organisation and 
action with the groups concerned? 
(b) Is the commonality that countries are less poor? In that case, it may be important to remember that 
MICs cover a wide income range (see Box 3.2) above, and that there are many poor people in MICs 
(see Section 4 below). 
(c) Is the commonality that countries are less dependent on aid – they need it less or are offered less? 
For the MDBs this is a particularly important way of classifying their clients, since it determines the 
terms of their access to credit9 and the size of the market for MDB services. For all donors, and for 
donors collectively, the level of aid dependence affects the forms of dialogue and influence that are 
available. 
                                                   
8  Bilateral-multilateral dynamics are further discussed in Section 5 below. 
9  Hence, the WB MIC task force considered classifying MICs (defined in terms of IBRD/IDA eligibility) into 
low, medium and high capital access countries. See Table 5 in Middle Income Countries: Development Challenges and 
Growing Global Role, Peter Fallon, Vivian Hon, Zia Qureshi and Dilip Ratha, World Bank, August 2001.  
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(d) Is the desire to have groups that are in some senses homogeneous, or sharing common problems or 
common relationships? If so, the MIC classification may actually cut across geographical groupings 
that correlate, though not perfectly, with the distinct but overlapping catchments of the major 
regional banks (AsDB, AfDB, IADB, EBRD) the UN regional agencies, (UNECA, ECLAC, ESCAP, 
etc), and other regional institutions.  
 
This last issue relates to who determines the groups. Are groupings according to donor perspectives 
consistent with how such countries categorise themselves according to other criteria that cut across the 
donor classification system(s)? Examples would be common membership of a geographical region such as 
the Mekong Basin, or the Andes, cultural affinity such as the Turkic speaking countries of Asia, or 
membership of a free trade zone. How and to what extent does the donor MIC-LIC view of the world 
influence policy and practice in relation to these other classification systems?   
Our general impression is that, both for analysis and especially for organisational purposes, it will 
usually make most sense to consider “MIC issues” within the context of regional, geographical and 
cultural groupings of countries, whose membership is rarely exclusively MIC. Comparing countries that 
have strong common elements is useful, not because of any assumption of linear progress, nor because 
they are assumed to require the same formulas, but because their similarities may make their differences 
more revealing. Taking a regional grouping perspective also throws light on the relations between 
countries in the region. For example, some MICs are sources of financial and technical aid for 
neighbouring LICs and may play a leadership role in international fora and trade negotiations as well as in 
regional conflict resolution. An aid relationship with a significant regional MIC might well in an indirect 
way bring significant benefits to a neighbouring LIC. As we discuss in the next section, this is one of the 
reasons why aid agencies might be interested in MICs.  
 
4  Why aid agencies are/should be interested in MICs 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Why and how donors give aid (in MICs and elsewhere) is linked to assumptions about the objectives of 
aid and the nature of relationships (between giving and receiving governments, and between receiving 
governments and their citizens). This section raises a number of issues that are likely to be more important 
or at least more obvious in MICs than in LICs. The reasons for wanting and receiving aid are likely to be 
more complex in MICs than LICs because of a wider range of interests at play in both receiving and 
giving countries. 
General statements about why MICs are important from an aid perspective are imperilled by the 
definition and the poverty line chosen (in particular the WB studies which are often quoted link the WB-
specific definition, which includes several populous LICs, to the $2 a day poverty line). However, the basic 
reasons why OECD governments are interested in MICs are (a) poverty (and other MDGs), 
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(b) international public goods and (c) other aspects of bilateral and multilateral relationships, relating to 
commercial and political interests (White 2000). 
It is important not to confuse the positive (why richer countries do provide assistance to poorer 
ones) with the normative (why they should do so). The role of aid has to be understood in the wider 
context of international relations. The “realist” approach to international relations assumes that each 
country pursues its own interest and that aid is a part of that pursuit. This could explain why countries 
with similar problems of poverty and governance may get different amounts of aid. The normative 
approach does not disregard the possibility of national self interest but also notes there may be a strong 
constituency in the aid-giving country that favours a more equitable and just world (Willets 2001). 
It is quite common for aid agencies to seek to reconcile altruistic and self-interested motivations. 
Thus the new Swedish global development policy document stresses that its foundation is solidarity with 
poor and vulnerable people in other countries and recognition of its shared responsibility for the future of 
the world (Government of Sweden 2003). At the same time, the same policy document argues that there is 
no conflict between this solidarity objective and the promotion of Swedish business and research interests 
‘in order to maintain Sweden’s position in an environment that is often dominated by considerably larger 
and more influential countries’ (ibid: 79). 
Donors who are required to focus strictly on poverty reduction10 nevertheless need to take account 
of the wider interests that influence how other agencies operate. Different countries and different aid 
agencies have different perspectives that are shaped by their histories, constituencies, mandates, 
governance structures and habitual ways of doing business. Agencies with ostensibly similar objectives 
may still have strikingly different ways of managing aid. Agencies with clear objectives but more flexible 
operating guidelines have an opportunity to add more value by making their programmes complementary 
to those of less flexible donors (a point that is further explored in Section 5). 
 
4.2 Supporting the reduction of inequality and social exclusion 
There is substantial poverty (along with other MDG deficits) in MICs. Arguably, in such countries there is 
sufficient wealth for all individuals and their children to escape from absolute poverty. Thus, inequality is 
understood as cause, explanation and outcome of the continued existence of poverty. Severe or growing 
inequality is also seen to contribute to political unrest and social instability that in turn affect people’s 
livelihoods and their capacity to contribute to sustained economic growth.  
Debating about the significance of inequality in MICs, and why the countries need external aid to 
tackle it is not helped by the fuzzy way in which policy-makers and others often define the concept. 
Ambiguity in understanding is sometimes politically useful but it can also lead to ineffective aid with 
human and financial resources deployed to tackle symptoms rather than causes.  
In aid circles, “inequality” is commonly understood as observed (measured) inequality in distribution 
and/or consumption. This is the principal approach of the World Bank and other international finance 
                                                   
10  Such as is required by the UK International Development Act 2002. 
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institutions. They understand inequality in terms of disparities and quintiles and use the Gini coefficient to 
measure the extent of unequal distribution in income.11 Economists use modelling to find out how 
changes in the distribution of income among a population can have adverse or positive effects in terms of 
the proportion of the population living in poverty (as defined by an income or consumption figure). 
Inequality, understood in this distributional sense can also considered in relation to assets such as land or 
human capital such as educational attainments.  
 
Box 4.1 Unpacking the meanings given to inequality in development practice 
Observed (measured) inequality in distribution and/or consumption. This is the principal approach of the World 
Bank. It looks at inequality in terms of disparities and quintiles. Income differential can be compared against 
other ways of classifying humanity, for example on the basis of sex, age, geographical location.  
Inequality as difference in opportunity. This approach is based on concepts of status and rank in social 
systems. Class and other status ascriptions such as gender, age or ethnicity are understood as determining 
opportunities, for example in access to education or health care. “Social inequality” is commonly used in this 
sense of the term.  
Capability deprivation is the approach that underlies the human development index developed by the UNDP 
Human Development Reports, building on the work of Amartya Sen and concerned with the extent to which 
people have the freedom to make choices in their lives. 
Rights based approaches premised on the universality of human rights in which everyone has equal rights. The 
DFID policy paper (2000) notes that in practice it is often particular groups of people who cannot claim their 
rights in different areas of their lives because of discriminatory policies that result in inequitable outcomes. This 
leads to an interest in political inequality, citizenship and good governance. Much current work on rights has 
evolved from participatory approaches to development. 
Social exclusion: ‘the process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full 
participation in the society within which they live’ (De Haan 1999). The value of the concept is the potential to 
explore the processes that cause exclusion and thereby deprivation. 
Vertical and horizontal inequality distinguishes between differences in income, on the one hand, and 
differences between categories of the population in terms of ethnicity or gender, on the other hand.  
(Based on Eyben and Lovett 2004.) 
 
There is a wide variation in the Gini coefficient across MICs varying from 21.7 in Belarus to 74.3 in 
Namibia and it has been suggested that the conventional wisdom that inequality is higher in MICs than 
LICs is not well founded as there are high levels of income inequality there as well, particularly in Africa 
(McKay 2004). However, the Gini coefficient simply takes a snapshot of a particular moment in time and 
tells us nothing about the kinds of people who are rich and the kinds who are poor and the pattern of 
relations between them that make it harder or easier for people to move out of poverty. Thus, for 
example, it may be that despite the high Gini coefficient in parts of Africa, social and political networks 
and shared identities that include both rich and poor result in very different perceptions by policy-makers 
concerning what is happening in their society, as compared with some MICs where the Gini coeficient 
may be an indicator of historically deep divisions between different sections of society. Policy responses to 
inequality are shaped less by the height of the Gini coefficient than by the extent to which citizens 
perceive such income inequality to be fair (Humphrey 2001).  
                                                   
11  The Gini coefficient is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 means perfect equality (everyone has the same 
income) and 1 means perfect inequality (one person has all the income, everyone else earns nothing). 
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Inequality can be understood as relational as well as categorical – the second is an imperfect way of 
measuring the first and complementary qualitative methods are required to fully understand the processes 
that create and reproduce inequality. The processes leading to unequal distributional outcomes are often 
described as those of “social exclusion”. Because such processes cannot be easily quantified and measured 
they are difficult for bureaucratic systems to get to grips with. Aid agencies should be cautious of 
encouraging measurement when it might lead to a solidification of difference that can fuel conflict over 
allocation of resources or access to power.12 
If exclusion is understood as the processes that lead to different distributional outcomes, donors 
could enquire as to how global and national economic and social policies could contribute to influencing 
the transformation of these processes so that measurable indicators would be less skewed. The important 
point here is that policy-makers should not see themselves as directly trying to change the indicators but rather playing a role 
in shaping the processes. This might require quite different kinds of action in different places because while 
the measurable indicators may look similar in two different countries, the specific processes that led to 
them are likely to be historically contingent and possibly different.  
Thus, the challenge for aid agencies is to determine how best they can support processes that have 
the potential to reduce rather than reinforce exclusion. The complex and contingent nature of social 
change and the impossibility of predicting that a particular event will lead to a certain outcome suggests a 
possible approach to donor action is to develop long term and consistent relations with selected recipient 
organisations who are pursuing a social change agenda that is compatible with the donor’s own values and 
mission. Rather than aiming to achieve a predetermined specific real world change in which the recipient 
organisation is treated as an instrument to that change, the focus of donor effort would be in supporting 
that organisation’s own efforts in what may be a rapidly changing policy environment.13 Quite small 
interventions may have disproportionate effects in the long run. DFID’s work on partnerships in Brazil is 
an example of how a very small financial investment in strengthening the relationships between state 
government, civil society and an IFI, brought about significant shifts in social policy (Larbi-Jones 
forthcoming).  
The international human rights framework can provide some overall guidance in making choices for 
donor choices in terms of the organisations they select to establish relationships with. The DFID policy 
paper (2000) notes that in practice it is often particular groups of people who cannot claim their rights in 
different areas of their lives because of discriminatory policies that result in inequitable outcomes. This 
leads to an interest in political inequality, citizenship and good governance. A fresh but challenging 
approach from this  perspective is to  consider inequality  as the condition, process and  experience of the 
                                                   
12  See, for example, Appadurai’s (1993) discussion on measurement and the caste system. 
13  For a full discussion on this point see Groves and Hinton (2004). 
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power relations that constrain individuals, communities and even wider groups, such as nation states, from 
the same freedoms that are enjoyed by those with whom they are in a position of subordinate relationship. 
This political perspective would challenge statements such as that made in the Joint Issues Paper 
submitted to the Seminar on Development Cooperation and ‘Middle Income Countries’ held in Madrid in 
November 2002 where it was noted that a major problem in addressing poverty is a lack of information 
about the poor. An alternative argument to the Joint Issues Paper is that it is not information that is absent in MICs but 
rather a lack of interest of those in power to change the status quo.  
Aid has conventionally been a technical matter that constructs knowledge to support policy through 
instruments such as statistical surveys. However, should aid agencies continue to view poverty as a 
technical matter without paying attention to the power relations that sustain the high levels of poverty in 
Latin America and some other ‘Middle Income Countries’? By ignoring power, aid risks helping to 
maintain rather than transform the processes that keep people poor. The conflict and social unrest that 
can arise from the persistence of exclusive processes can of course also prevent growth and commercial 
opportunities to foreign investors. During the AECI/DFID visit to Peru, civil society representatives 
commented that inequality was the most pressing development issue but opinions were mixed as to 
whether this was a legitimate area for foreigners to be involved in because of its politicised nature. While 
such political questions raise difficult issues for donors, they are worth asking when considering channels 
for aid, discussed in Section 6. 
 
4.3 International public goods arguments 
What happens in MICs has an important influence on the rest of the world, including the Low Income 
Countries. A World Bank study puts the international public goods case for engagement with MICs as 
follows: 
 
The MICs are of systemic importance in key areas with the characteristics of global public goods, 
including poverty reduction, financial stability, protection of regional and global environmental 
commons, public health, orderly flows of trade, movement of capital and labour across borders, and 
control of trans-border crime including money laundering and drug trafficking. Reform-minded 
MICs are producers of global public goods; reform-averse MICs may thus be said to be potential 
producers of global public bads. 
(Fallon et al. 2001: 3) 
 
Thus there are both altruistic and non-altruistic reasons for wanting to reduce poverty in MICs: it may be 
valued for itself, and also seen as a contribution to global peace and stability and the expansion of global 
markets (including for LICs). The other public goods are similarly ambiguous. MICs have global 
environmental importance through forests, biodiversity and greenhouse gas emissions. International 
health threats such as HIV/AIDS necessarily involve MICs,  as do other trans-border issues such as crime 
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and drug trafficking. MICs are also more vulnerable to financial systemic risk than either developed 
countries or LICs and have been involved in contagious financial crises in Asia and Latin America (see 
Box 4.2). 
 
Box 4.2 MICs’ interest in the international financial architecture 
 
After the eruption of the late nineties crises, academics and international financial institutions renewed the 
debate on the causes of financial crises. Two main approaches could then be identified. On the one side, the 
conventional approach considered that mistakes in economic policy – mainly financial and banking 
mismanagement – led to the eruption of financial crises in South East Asia and Latin America. On the other 
side, a more heterodox focus stated that financial globalisation has had a leading role in the triggering of these 
crises. Academics have now come to a certain consensus that recognises the role of globalisation in financial 
crises. 
The process of financial globalisation has provoked a great increase of international financial flows. Most 
of these flows are from developed to developed countries and a smaller proportion is invested in developing 
countries. The main developing recipients of these flows are a small group of countries –the so-called 
“emerging markets”– which are, most of them, ‘Middle Income Countries’ (China, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Russia etc.). Besides, a high proportion of capital flows to these 
countries has a short-term maturity (short-term debt contracts, financial derivatives) and/or are liquid 
(portfolio investment –equities and debt securities). 
Liquid and unstable capital is more easily invested (and disinvested) in any country all over the world. 
Therefore, investors can over-react to any political, economic and social change creating a massive volume of 
capital inflows and outflows. Hence the volume and nature of international capital is creating increasing 
financial instability worldwide. This instability is having wider and severe economic and social effects: 
 
• Emerging markets have weaker financial structures than developed countries and, in many cases, 
massive capital inflows distort these structures. Moreover, capital outflows can provoke financial crises 
with severe economic and social consequences –mainly a rise in people living in poverty. 
• Financial, productive and trade linkages between emerging markets and other developing countries open 
the door to the contagion of emerging market crises to other middle income or low income countries 
(“Tequila effect”, for instance). The enchained crises of the late nineties resulted in a decrease of capital 
investment in developing countries. 
 
Possible solutions to these problems can be found in the so-called international financial architecture (IFA) 
which could be defined as the overall structure (agents and operative mechanisms) of international financial 
markets. Several issues have arisen in the debate on how to build a safer and more stable globalisation 
process: the creation of a new financial institution with the capacity to control the nature and destination of 
financial flows; international and national capital controls in order to contain the inflow and outflow of unstable 
capital; strengthening financial supervision and regulation at a recipient country level; the implementation of 
more stable exchange rate regimes in developing countries and regulation and supervision of financial 
derivatives. 
 
 
Public goods issues were prominent in the MICs visited for this study. Aside from their interest in 
international trade, finance and environmental issues, assuaging internal conflict that has external 
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repercussions is a major concern for donors in Colombia; the drugs trade and the USA-supported coca 
eradication programmes are a central concern in both Colombia and Peru, while three of the countries 
most affected by Jamaican crime are providing aid to that country’s police force. (See Section 5 for more 
on the aid environment in these countries.) 
It is worth noting that many of these public goods concerns give rise to vertical, “single issue” 
programmes, such as the Global Environment Facility, global funds to address AIDS and other major 
diseases, anti-drug campaigns, etc. Such vertical programmes are likely to be proportionately more 
important in less aid-dependent MICs. An important role for in-country donors and their review 
mechanisms may be to monitor how international vertical programmes interact with each other and with 
conventional programmes at country level. E.g. is a vertical HIV/AIDS intervention adequately integrated 
with other health services? How does aid focused on anti-drug campaigns affect poverty strategy? and so 
forth. 
Equally, helping MICs to pursue their interests in international public goods more effectively (e.g. by 
strengthening their capacity for trade negotiations) may be more valuable to them than financial aid.  
Another externality argument is the belief that by giving aid to these countries donors can learn good 
practice for aid to LICs. The MIC combination of less aid dependence, different country contexts and 
more varied motives for aid means that donors have to learn to be agile and adapt to different 
circumstances. 
 
4.4 Whose power, whose voice, whose knowledge in the relationship? 
In a speech two years ago on the role of aid in MICs a World Bank vice-president made an explicit 
comparison with the EU policy on structural funds for disadvantaged regions within the Union (Linn 
2001). This comparison is worth pursuing as it highlights the differences in the relationship between 
donor and recipient in the two cases. Structural Funds are the European Union’s main instruments for 
supporting social and economic restructuring across the Union. Particularly relevant are the “objective 
one” funds for less developed regions in the EU. The procedures for allocating and managing the money 
are very different from that applied by EU member states to countries or regions outside the Union.  
The EU structural funds are genuinely owned by the receiving member government who is part of a 
collective driving seat which is the EU Council of Ministers (CEPII 1999). Compared with aid to ‘Middle 
Income Countries’ the funds are allocated on an entitlement, rather than a gift basis. That means funding 
cannot start and stop on the caprice of the donor. The lack of certainty and predictability concerning 
duration and amount of aid constrains the efficient use of the resources. Recipients cannot plan their use 
ahead of time nor, despite the best efforts of the PRSP process do they have a strong voice in determining 
how the aid from a particular donor should be spent.   
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5  Good practice for aid to MICs 
In this section we consider how the context for aid in MICs is likely to differ from that in LICs, and what 
this implies for donors (especially bilaterals) considering which countries to support, which channels to 
use for their aid, and how to adapt the principles of good practice to MIC circumstances. Illustrations are 
drawn from the four Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries visited in connection with this paper. 
 
5.1 Institutional framework for aid management in MICs 
 
5.1.1 General considerations 
Recent good practice recommendations in the DAC guidelines on harmonisation (OECD 2003) have 
acknowledged problems that can arise from lack of coordination among donors and the simultaneous 
imposition of many different donors’ procedures and conditions. It is stressed that the primary 
responsibility for coordination should rest with the recipient government, and that the primary arena for 
coordination and harmonisation should be in-country. At the same time, the background studies for the 
DAC guidelines, together with more recent work on aid instruments in Asia (Hubbard 2004; Lister 2003) 
have highlighted the level of aid dependence and the degree of congestion among aid agencies as key 
determinants of the aid management approaches adopted by governments and donors. The incentive to 
develop more elaborate systems for managing and coordinating aid, and to adopt programme based 
approaches to aid, is much greater where the number of donors is large and aid represents an important 
share of public resources. 
In many aid dependent LICs, the imbalance in financial resources is underscored by scarcity of 
human capital (especially in the government sector), which is graphically illustrated when small numbers 
of high level government staff are overwhelmed by the huge visiting teams from donors. MICs are likely 
to be much less aid dependent, and are also likely to have greater management and administrative 
capacity.14 There is likely to be less interest in the Millennium Consensus’s holistic mechanisms for 
strategy formulation, government-donor dialogue and aid coordination. Donors have much less leverage 
to insist on such mechanisms if the recipient is not convinced of their merits, and in any case the volume 
of aid and degree of congestion and overlap between donors is much less likely to justify the transaction 
costs – for both sides – of more elaborate mechanisms. The balance of influence between different aid 
institutions may also be different: non-concessional development finance – which does not feature in 
figures of ODA per capita – is much more important in MICs, and should increase the relative 
importance of the IFIs which provide it (see Box 3.1 above). 
                                                   
14  However, the correlation between income and human resource capacities is far from perfect. As Table A2 in 
Annex A illustrates, there are many inconsistencies between income and HDI rankings. The exploitation of 
natural resources, such as oil, may relax financial constraints without a commensurate improvement in the 
quality of a country’s human resources and institutions. 
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Accordingly, the PRSP – at least so far – is a Low Income Country, and predominantly African, 
phenomenon.15 Although the complete PRSP package may be inappropriate for most MICs, the relevance 
of its different elements can also be considered separately. For example, it may make sense for donors to 
share institutional and fiduciary assessments or monitoring of poverty outcomes even where project aid 
continues to be the dominant modality for aid delivery. It is still relevant to enquire about the strategic 
coherence of aid to MICs, and to investigate whether aid has a positive or negative effect on the capacity 
of the partner country and its government. 
As noted, a central finding of the DAC country studies on aid effectiveness was that the key arena 
for coordination and harmonisation was at country level (OECD 2003). There may be practical difficulties 
in applying this insight to some MICs where, for example many donors may not have country level 
representation or may be less strategic in their commitment, and where the host country may have less 
interest in orchestrating donors collectively rather than dealing with them individually. 
There may also be subtle differences in the relationship between poverty-oriented donors and the 
host government. Problems in LICs are more easily perceived as a shortage of resources, which aid can 
address. In providing aid to a Low Income Country there is an a priori assumption (often erroneous) that 
the recipient government is doing its best to improve the welfare of its citizens but lacks the necessary 
wherewithal. In those ‘Middle Income Countries’ with widespread, high and sustained levels of poverty 
this assumption is harder to make. Donors fear that their aid may be used by the ruling elite as a safety net 
or palliative, providing the means to avoid tackling deep-rooted problems. They start to look for ways to 
deploy their aid so as to influence processes that will lead to structural change, in other words, processes 
that will convince the elite that they should take responsibility for the poverty in their country. 
 
5.1.2 Country examples  
These issues were explored in the four LAC countries shown in Box 5.1. Although all are classified as 
Lower MICs, and three of them are neighbours in the Andean region, there are sharp contrasts that warn 
against superficial generalisations about MICs. Bolivia is much the poorest country overall, with a much 
higher proportion of its population in absolute poverty. It is also the only one that is significantly 
dependent on aid (the ODA/GNI ratio in the other countries is less than 1 per cent; in Bolivia it is close 
to 10 per cent). HDI rankings for the other three countries are quite close, with Bolivia a long way behind. 
Indeed, as we show in more detail below, although Bolivia is just over the LMIC threshold, its aid 
environment has much more in common with LICs than with its neighbouring MICs. 
There are also illuminating contrast in the motives for, and the management of, aid in the other three 
countries reviewed. In all the cases, a small number of donors, usually ones with obvious regional and 
political interests in the country concerned, provide most of its ODA. Only in Jamaica (where the EC has 
                                                   
15  From the most recent list of PRSPs and Interim PRSPs available (see Annex A), the only countries involved 
which are not Low Income (DAC classification) are Albania, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, 
Bolivia, Honduras and Guyana. Of these, the last three have the incentive of debt relief under the HIPC 
initiative. 
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a strong presence) do multilateral agencies provide a large share of ODA – although, as we shall see, non-
concessional development financing by multilateral banks is significant in the less ODA-dependent 
countries. 
 
Box 5.1 Four LAC country aid profiles 
 Bolivia Colombia Peru Jamaica 
Population 
(2002) 
 8.7m  43.7m  26.7m  2.6m 
GNI per capita 
(USD) 
 900  1,830  2,050  2,820 
HDI ranking  114  64  82  78 
NET ODA/GNI  9.1%  0.6%  0.9%  0.3% 
Top donors (gross  Germany 29% USA 69% USA 32% EC 31% 
ODA): (share of  USA 15% Spain 7% Japan 29% USA 18% 
top ten total) IDA 13% Germany 5% Germany 12% CaribDB 12% 
 IDB 11% Japan 4% UK 8% Canada 10% 
 Netherlands 8% Netherlands 4% Spain 6% Japan 10% 
 Japan 7% EC 4% Netherlands 4% UK 7% 
 Spain 4% France 3% EC 3% Netherlands 4% 
 UK 4% IDB 2% Switzerland 2% Arab countries 4% 
 Austria 4% Norway 2% Canada 2% Germany 3% 
 Denmark 3% Sweden 1% France 1% Arab agencies 1% 
Bilateral share of 
gross ODA 
76% 92% 93% 55% 
 
Source: OECD DAC; UNDP HDR (2003). 
 
Aid management issues in Bolivia, and the response to them, resemble those in aid dependent countries in 
other regions. Indeed, Bolivia has been something of a pioneer: the prototype Comprehensive 
Development Framework emerged here in 1999 (although the 2002 CDF evaluation (World Bank 2003) 
found that coordination amongst donors was still weak). A national dialogue in 2000 was part of the 
process from which the present poverty strategy derives. Despite this, issues of broad-based ownership 
were a problem from the start (Eyben 2004b) and there have been since serious governmental crises 
around implementation of key elements of national strategy, with the revenue issues and the regime for 
natural gas exploitation proving particularly contentious. The PRS objective of building a national 
consensus around politically divisive issues such as land tenure, ethnicity and social exclusion is likely to 
prove extremely challenging. As in many PRSP countries, the lack of an effective link between the strategy 
and medium term budgeting and resource management is a serious weakness; there is evidence that the 
strategy is not financially sustainable, but the mechanisms for costing and prioritising are poorly 
developed. Congestion among donors is evident, as are the transaction costs of aid, and the potential for 
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project-focused aid to undermine government capacity. Response included a number of sector SWAps 
and pooled funding arrangements amongst donors, as well as moves towards coordinated budget support 
(Nickson 2002). As, technically, a LMIC, Bolivia has reached the limit of access to IDA and to IDB 
concessional lending, but poor credit ratings prevent the government from accessing IBRD resources. 
These and related graduation issues cause uncertainty but both the IMF and the World Bank have been 
flexible and helpful in making the case for Bolivia to all intents and purposes to be treated like a LIC. 
The aid environment in Colombia is dominated by the continuing internal conflict, which has been 
sustained for more than a generation, has led to millions of people being internally displaced, with large 
areas of the country not under the effective control of the government. There is a sharp contrast between 
the roles of the multilateral development banks, which attempt to pursue a development agenda and of 
bilateral donors, for whom the conflict itself is the primary concern. Twenty-four foreign governments 
have joined together in a common Dialogue with the Colombian government, and there is a consensus 
among bilaterals that the G24 provides an effective mechanism for engaging with Colombia. Leadership 
amongst the donors rotates, the Swiss currently lead with UNDP providing a secretariat to the group. The 
presence of five Latin American countries in the G24 was seen as particularly important in terms of 
legitimacy and credibility with the Colombian Government. Brazil will lead the Group later in 2004. 
United Nations agencies, including the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, play a significant 
role. Coordination reflects the political rather than the monetary importance of aid. The government 
coordinating body (ACCI) has produced a plan for international cooperation focused on “democratic 
security” and the government is interested in more systematic monitoring of the MDGs. 
While bilaterals channel a high proportion of their grants through national and international NGOs 
(partly reflecting the ability of NGOs to operate in areas not under effective government control), the 
multilateral banks channel sector loans through the government. Many donors feel that closer liaison with 
the MDBs would be advantageous, linking their social expertise to the humanitarian efforts of the 
bilaterals, and that the most efficient way to do this would be to involve them more in the G24 
framework. The donor cooperation picture is already complicated by the perception that Plan Colombia (a 
US/Colombia bilateral plan which to many has become synonymous with controversial anti-narcotics 
policies) sits uneasily outside the National Development Plan and the Government’s International 
Cooperation Plan.  
Peru is the one sample country which lacks a well-articulated framework for donor coordination, with 
neither the aid dependence of Bolivia nor the urgency of the ongoing conflict in Colombia. Bilateral aid is 
largely focused on technical assistance (though, again, coca eradication is a major concern for the USA in 
particular). Despite the trend to higher priced lending, multilateral agencies in Peru are sustaining long-
term relationships but there is no framework for coordination with bilaterals. Potential for coordination 
by the government is weakened by the fact that loans and grants are overseen by separate agencies, and 
line ministries themselves have powerful coordination units. Much bilateral aid is channelled via NGOs 
which do not come under the purview of the grant coordinating agency. With modest volumes of aid, the 
priority for harmonisation is a framework for strategic dialogue, not donor procedures (although there are, 
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however, CDF best practice issues which would improve trust, particularly transparency in donor 
procedures and analysis). Government, donor and civil society representatives all noted that the lack of 
such a framework prevents a discussion about the most appropriate role for donors (which could centre 
on the provision of knowledge, not cash). This is particularly important for Peru as the long-term 
challenge of addressing inequalities is essentially political and the role of foreigners is contested. An 
outsider visiting is unlikely to see Peru primarily through a per capita income lens. Alternative starting 
points to consider include: an inequitable society; a post conflict state, a vulnerable transition economy, an 
emerging democracy; a stakeholder in an Andean political economy. These different starting points could 
lead to alternative debates about the role of outsiders. EU member state representatives see the long-term 
nature of the problems facing Peru: high inequalities, a fragile political framework, and social exclusion 
and the potential for conflicts. They agreed the danger then was a myopic debate about aid allocations to 
Peru rather than a strategic debate about what influence the donor community might have in the medium 
term to assist with some deeply embedded problems (i.e. the donor role not donor resources). 
In Jamaica, the Government has an explicit poverty strategy. A review in 2003 of the Government’s 
National Poverty Eradication Programme and an analysis of Jamaica’s performance against the MDGs 
indicate that Government is continuing to give a high priority to poverty reduction. But a prevailing 
narrow view of poverty, weak implementation, over-emphasis on poverty alleviation (at the expense of 
prevention and reduction), all detract from the effectiveness of the efforts and resources that are applied. 
Jamaica is constrained by a heavy debt burden: its MIC status means it must borrow at IBRD rates, but its 
debt situation is preventing new lending, and the World Bank is largely inactive, though Jamaica is a pilot 
country for harmonisation. Nevertheless, in 2002, loans from IFIs totalled US$188m and bilateral grants 
totalled US$43.1m, a total of US$231.1m, i.e. 4.86 per cent of the Government of Jamaica’s annual 
budget. Different perspectives on economic strategy mean that Jamaica does not have a current IMF 
programme, and the Government has been ambivalent towards formal donor coordination, being wary of 
mechanisms that might lead donors to “gang up” on it.  
However, in the absence of a relationship with the IMF (a trigger for many donors’ assistance), 
donors have persuaded government to produce a medium term socio-economic framework to set out its 
development priorities. This is built on government’s existing plans, but these have been coordinated 
across the sectors and prioritised. Donors have begun to coordinate around this strategy, with the aim of 
focusing their assistance on government’s priorities. The EU will use this framework as a trigger for 
release of €40m of direct budget support. The Ministry of Finance and Planning and a group of seven key 
aid agencies (DFID, World Bank, IADB, EC, UNDP, CIDA and USAID) agreed that this group should 
produce a model for strategic dialogue between the Ministry/PIOJ16 and the aid agencies. It was also 
agreed with the Minister that discussions on prioritisation of aid should take place with the group, rather 
than  on a  bilateral basis.  The need to ensure a  properly harmonised effort is  seen as so crucial to  many 
                                                   
16  Planning Institute of Jamaica. 
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international partners that CIDA, UNDP and the EC have all offered to provide assistance to PIOJ to 
strengthen their capacity to coordinate. There are also several examples of co-funding and a multi-donor 
effort to support reforms in public sector management. 
In all four countries, the relationships between bilateral and multilateral agencies were particularly 
interesting, and we return to this theme in light of the discussion of aid agency choices which follows.  
 
5.2 Aid agency choices 
There are many dimensions to the choices that bilateral aid agencies make concerning their involvement 
with MICs. Which countries, and who in those countries, should benefit from assistance? Which channels 
should be used to deliver assistance? In which arenas (country-level, regional or global) should the donor 
operate? Should the current institutional framework for aid be taken as given, or should the donor try to 
modify it? And how much should the donor adapt to what other aid agencies are doing? Pro-active donors 
will be more aware of the potentials for competition and collaboration among agencies, and will 
consciously seek areas of comparative advantage that maximise the added value of their contribution.  
 
5.2.1 Choosing beneficiary countries 
With MICs drawing proportionately less aid than poorer countries, the dangers of spreading aid too thin 
become greater. Significant criteria for remaining involved in particular MICs include poverty and other 
development deficits (e.g. as revealed by the MDGs), country vulnerability (economic, social or political), 
historical relationships and accumulated country expertise (the positive aspects of inertia), public goods of 
special significance, the regional importance of some major MICs; and the scope for filling “gaps” left by 
other donors. Finally, there may be a sensible case for opting to provide aid to a MIC within a region or 
sub-region otherwise composed of LICs because of the economic and political significance of the close 
ties between the countries concerned. Whatever the reasons for the choice, donors simultaneously have to 
decide who within the country they particularly want to assist, and all these aspects will have a bearing on 
the choice of channels for delivering aid. 
 
5.2.2 Aid channels 
For bilateral donors the choices of aid channels are: 
 
• Direct government to government aid. 
• Indirect government to government aid via the intermediary of a multilateral organisation. (The EC 
provides aid collectively on behalf of EU members; bilaterals are shareholders in the MDBs and also 
collaborate in specific projects, through joint funding or by providing complementary TA.) 
• Direct government to country (civil society/private sector) aid. In Colombia 50 per cent of total 
ODA flows through NGOs although it is not clear how much of this is via a donor country NGO 
and how much goes directly; it is highly fragmented aid that is excluded from consideration in the 
government’s international cooperation plan, but assumes a particular importance when parts of the 
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country are beyond the reach of conventional government services. Even in less extreme 
circumstances (e.g. Bolivia) donors have to consider whether the government is sufficiently legitimate 
in the eyes of the poor people of the country to make it a credible recipient of donor assistance.  
• Indirect government to country, via the intermediary of an NGO or other civil society organisation 
in the donor country (and sometimes matched with voluntary contributions from private citizens). 
Again, Colombia provides striking examples of strong connections between local and global civil 
society institutions, including the trades union movement and the Catholic Church.  
 
Influencing processes for poverty reduction is neither sequential nor linear. There are antecedents to the 
donor-recipient relationship, to current understandings of the situation and to the aid instruments 
employed. While recognising the constraint that this history to the relationship may shape choice of aid 
channels, we propose that such a choice be informed by considering the questions proposed in the 
following table (Box 5.2) and that relate to the issues of power, voice and knowledge discussed in the 
previous section. (The same broad factors are also relevant for LICs, but the answers for MICs may be 
less straightforward, and the donor strategy many need to be more selective.) 
 
Box 5.2 Relevant factors for choice of aid channels to support poverty reduction in 
MICs17 
What changes in policy are we 
looking for? 
Which forms of knowledge dominate this policy process? Whose 
knowledge is excluded? What are the principal storylines and key 
framing assumptions that shape policy in this area? What knowledge are 
we using? What are we ignoring? 
How could the change happen? Where are things happening that might have wider impact? Which actors 
operate in these spaces? Who is included and excluded? 
Who could make it happen? Who are the key actors associated with this policy process? Which actors 
are most powerful? Which are excluded? What kind of actor are we? How 
do we behave?  
What do we need to do to make the 
desired change happen? 
Does one engage with spaces dominated by the powerful, or add weight 
to the spaces of the powerless? How might different spaces be better 
connected?  
How will we know if we have 
succeeded? 
How can we track the process? How can we listen to what our partners 
tell us?  
 
5.2.3 Lessons for effective aid to MICs 
There are some tensions in the aid relationship that appear to be particularly striking in ‘Middle Income 
Countries’. Many of the larger MICs have more complex and diverse institutions both within and outside 
government and donors can find themselves involved in internal political conflicts through the choice of 
whom they decide to associate with. A workshop with DFID staff in Latin America identified the 
following as significant lessons for effective aid (Hobley 2003): 
 
                                                   
17  Taken from Eyben (2004a). The questions in the left hand column originate from work by David Watson in 
Bangladesh.  
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• Money or resource power does help to get a seat at particular tables but not necessarily all the tables 
necessary to support effective change. 
• Position power and resource power without the skills, competences and credibility is insufficient to 
build effective relationships. 
• Relationships: often focus on those where there are high levels of perceived comfort i.e. working with other 
donors in coordination groups whilst missing more effective entry-points with other less obvious 
actors. 
• Long term investment in institutional relationships with these other actors can support effective change even 
when little or no financial resources are transferred and high levels of spending may distract from the 
construction of effective relationships. Any relationship investment should be informed and tested 
by its capacity to support and not undermine poor people’s empowerment. 
• It is important to work on demand-side issues as well as supply-side. Past programmes, however, mainly 
focused on supply and improving supply-side relationships rather than building capability of people 
to articulate their demands, influence decision-making and access resources.  
• The lesson that support to effective change through investing in relationships is much harder to 
achieve without a country office (staffed with senior personnel and delegated authority) applies equally 
to MICs. 
• Donor knowledge of the political, social and institutional policy context is vital for effectiveness but they 
must consider who and how they finance for the acquisition of that knowledge and the impact this 
will have on their understanding of the structural causes of poverty.  
 
5.3 Bilateral-multilateral relationships 
 
5.3.1 General issues 
It may be useful to consider aid providers to MICs in three groups: the MDBs, other multilaterals 
(principally the UN organisations and the EU), and bilateral donors. The IFIs have a particular concern 
over MICs – that they may lose them as clients if they no longer qualify for concessional aid and consider 
that they can borrow elsewhere with fewer strings attached. A major concern of the World Bank MIC task 
force was how to maintain a presence in non-borrowing MICs against the day when borrowing might 
again be required, and in order to maintain a global presence and provide intellectual services. The other 
multilaterals do not have to earn their presence in the MICs in the same way, and the bilaterals can, in 
principle, freely choose which countries they want to be involved in. 
It is important to consider the interactions between these three groups of aid agencies: 
 
(a) Bilaterals have advantages of flexibility and scope: they are inherently less rule-bound than 
multilateral  organisations,  and more able  (though not  necessarily more willing)  to venture into the 
 26 
more political areas of aid. On the other hand, they are prone to spread themselves too thinly to have 
strong country-level representation, and may not sustain the kind of long-term relationships needed 
to address structural poverty in MICs. 
(b) The MDBs of course have a vested interest in maintaining MIC demand for their services, but they 
may indeed have an advantage in certain areas, including aspects of policy advice, fiduciary 
assessments and support to public finance management. Their ability to maintain continuity and to 
draw on relevant regional and global experience can also be valuable, to the donor community as well 
as the country directly. Bilaterals (not least as MDB shareholders) should consider what continuing 
role the MDBs may usefully perform in MICs, and whether they should support that role financially 
(e.g. through trust funds or secondments). 
(c) Both the MDBs and other bilaterals offer vehicles for collective action that may offset the fickleness 
and special interests of particular bilaterals. Indeed, as implied by our previous discussion concerning 
the capricious nature of bilateral aid, multilaterals may be a vehicle for moving global aid away from 
gift relationships and towards entitlements. Bilaterals should consider carefully the balance between 
their own direct efforts and resources channelled to MICs through multilaterals. 
 
One means for channelling aid to ‘Middle Income Countries’ is to use bilateral technical assistance in 
conjunction with multilateral concessional lending ‘to ensure that the international system works 
effectively for the elimination of poverty in ‘Middle Income Countries’’. This could mean supporting 
United Nations grant-giving organisations as well as the international finance institutions providing 
concessional loans. Some bilateral agencies have tended to be more interested in the latter, on the 
argument that it is the IFIs that manage the large financial resources. There are several issues associated 
with this choice: 
 
• If structural and sustained poverty in ‘Middle Income Countries’ is not a product of absolute lack of 
resources but of internal distribution of these resources, then the provision of additional resources 
would not appear to be a solution to the problem; indeed, there is a considerable likelihood that these 
resources will be captured by the rich and powerful in the recipient country. 
• The argument is that by close association with the IFIs a bilateral agency can ensure the additional 
resources are not captured in this way but are effectively used to reduce structural poverty. The 
implication of this argument is that without such efforts by a bilateral agency the IFIs by themselves 
would be less interested and/or effective at ensuring the resources were used in this way. Thus, the 
success of this strategy of close association with the development banks depends on the bilateral 
agency being able to influence the international finance institutions more than they are able to 
influence the agency. Banks necessarily have a supply driven relationship with Ministries of Finance; 
bilateral donors have the possibility of responding more flexibly and broadly to demands coming 
from many different sectors. 
 27 
• A balance may need to be struck between channelling resources through the IFIs, with their often 
greater intellectual capacity and always greater resources, and through the United Nations system 
which potentially has more credibility and legitimacy with recipient governments and society, 
particularly with regard to the political issues that are inherent in tackling inequality, conflict and 
poverty. 
• The focus on making the global system work better must be matched with a concern to support local 
efforts, bearing in mind that much real change, as distinct from paper-policy change, comes from 
ground-level action. 
 
5.3.2 Country examples 
Relationships between bilaterals and multilaterals were a significant issue in all four countries visited. 
Bolivia’s HIPC/PRSP framework was the environment in which bilateral/multilateral synergies are most 
easily captured, but the other countries were more problematic.  
In Colombia, the MDBs (the World Bank, IADB and CAF) provided multi-billion dollar non-
concessional lending to meet Colombia’s fiscal gap of 2.8 per cent of GDP in 2003. The Banks also 
undertake important analytical work on taxation, corruption and studies to examine the costs of violence. 
The division between the urgent conflict-related agendas of security and rights and the longer-term 
sectoral development agenda is mirrored in a parallel split between bilateral and multilateral lending 
donors. The IADB, the World Bank and the UNDP are all involved in supporting the Government’s 
efforts to produce a PRSP and to help the Government to report effectively on the MDGs in 2005. The 
Banks would welcome invitations to be more closely involved in the G24. Colombia could usefully extend 
the current human rights focus to include longer-term issues such as health and education and possibly 
more structural issues such as taxation. In this regard, the World Bank and the IADB knowledge and 
experience of the health and education sectors, derived through their lending operations, could be more 
closely brought into the mainstream of the G24 process and the bilaterals agree that closer involvement by 
the Multilateral Banks in the G24 dialogue would be welcomed. However there was no evidence to 
suggest that bilateral donors see the connection with their IFI Board representatives as avenues for 
influence or engagement in Colombia.   
In Peru, as in Colombia, non-concessional development finance, from both the World Bank and the 
IADB is important, but, as noted earlier, there is no institutional framework for strategic collaboration 
among government, multilaterals and bilaterals.   
In Jamaica, the fact that the Government is unable, or unwilling, to access non-concessional funds 
may deprive it – and its grant-aid partners – of useful analytical support. There are also more immediate 
effects: the government has had to re-prioritise its loan-funded programmes – and those which it could 
not support with counterpart funds were suspended or cancelled. This had a knock-on effect on bilateral 
TA (Technical Assistance) programmes which were agreed on the assumption that the MDBs would 
provide the bulk of finance. The development of the Medium Term Social and Economic Framework 
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(MTSEF) is an attempt to provide a government-led focus for collaboration jointly with bilateral and 
multilateral partners. In purely financial terms, the multilaterals would seem to be alone in having some 
leverage over public policy. However, in practice, some strategic low-volume funding by grant donors is 
proving to have considerable impact on Government policy (e.g. funding the development of a White 
Paper on Public Sector Modernisation, and the funding of the Jamaica Social Policy Evaluation (JASPEV) 
that aims to ensure all Jamaican Government Ministries develop a pro-poor policy on specific issues such 
as youth exclusion. 
 
6  Conclusion and further issues 
This paper has discussed the various understandings of what is a ‘Middle Income Country’ and has 
explored the significance for aid to MICs in terms of global public good arguments as well as in relation to 
the problems of inequality and social exclusion in these countries. In considering what is donor good 
practice in a Middle Income Country we have argued that for such practice to be successful it must take 
into account the multiplex relations between donor and recipient governments that shape the motives and 
behaviour of both sides to the relationship as well as take into account those between and within 
multilateral and bilateral organisations. 
In most ‘Middle Income Countries’ (MICs) there is not an overall and immediate and critical 
shortage of either human capital or financial resources. Aid as a proportion of GDP is usually modest, and 
consequently donors have little direct leverage. The role of donors must be to support the agenda of those 
local actors, government or otherwise, who are working for the kind of change that a donor judges 
worthwhile. 
If a Middle Income Country has a track record of rapid improvement in the welfare of its population, 
aid may primarily be justified to speed things up, not only to increase welfare but also to expand the 
market for OECD (and LIC) goods and services as well as to build good international relations. 
Conversely, if no or little progress is being made, aid may be justified because of the very lack of progress 
in poverty reduction that may be due to deep structural inequalities and exclusion of much of the 
population. In this latter case, the choice of channels and instruments of aid may be rather different and 
great care should be taken to ensure that commercial and political interests of the donor government do 
not undermine the aid effort. When the purpose of aid is to reduce inequalities a donor may need to be 
there for the long haul with a commitment and preparedness to invest staff time in developing and 
maintaining institutional relationships. Finally, good aid practice needs to take account of the diversity 
among MICs and the significance of regional groupings that cut across the MIC-LIC divide. The case for 
specific, non-country based support to regional institutions should always be considered. 
Coordinated aid mechanisms, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, developed primarily for 
Low Income Countries may not be appropriate (because the volume of aid does not justify the transaction 
costs involved)  or  acceptable  (because  of  the general  lack  of  donor  leverage)  or  even  useful  to  the 
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recipients (because there may be different solutions to a complex and divergent development problem and 
different parts of the recipient government system may prefer to establish autonomous relations with 
separate donors).  
 
Box 6.1 Relevance to the role of aid in MICs of lessons learnt from the CDF evaluation18 
CDF lesson Relevance to MICs 
Donors should support efforts to 
strengthen budget processes and align 
their assistance with national development 
strategies 
To the extent that MICs have stronger systems and higher 
capacity (not universally true) there is less reason for donors to 
bypass government systems in disbursing aid. However, MICs 
may be less willing to concede donor involvement in review of 
such systems, and in the formulation of national strategies. 
Donors should support national development strategies when 
these are credible, have broad-based support (particularly among 
poor people) and match donor objectives of poverty reduction. 
Donors and recipient country 
bureaucracies should strengthen cross-
sector dialogue and planning, and break 
down institutional sectoral silos 
In non-aid dependent countries, recipient country bureaucracies 
are only likely to be interested in such a dialogue when there is 
clear evidence that it will help them do better what they are 
interested in. Less obvious “leverage” for donors puts a premium 
on understanding local interests and persuading rather than 
dictating (but this is supposed to be the PRSP paradigm too . . .) 
Donors should work hard to integrate 
monitoring and evaluation activities into 
normal government (rather than donor) 
operations 
Donors should particularly bear in mind the way that their 
resources are often appreciated by recipients as a means for 
supporting innovation and to pilot new approaches; as such the 
key point is that the learning and experience is widely 
disseminated and shared. 
Donors should build on progress in 
increasing national ownership by 
broadening engagement with sectoral and 
regional authorities, elected officials and 
legislators, and with marginalised groups. 
There may be both more need and more scope for such 
engagements in MICs, and bilateral donors may be well placed to 
pursue them.  
Both donors and recipients need to change 
behaviour and processes to give up 
individual interests in order to achieve 
better development outcomes through 
joint action. 
Bilateral aid to MICs is usually part of a more complex 
relationship between the two countries possibly involving political, 
security and commercial interests. The challenge for the donor 
agency is to seek to align all these interests in support of the 
poverty reduction objective. 
Donors should try to address domestic 
political resistance to harmonising 
procedures, providing budget support and 
reducing the use of international 
consultants. 
Budget support may not be an appropriate or welcome aid 
instrument in MICs. However, the general principles of 
harmonising procedures remain valid. Because of the higher 
levels of human capital in MICs there is even less justification for 
contracting large numbers of international staff. 
Recipient countries should implement and 
enforce procurement and other 
accountability rules that will foster donor 
confidence 
If the aid flows are relatively small, the incentive for such action 
is more likely to come from attracting FDI. However, promoting 
internationally acceptable fiduciary and governance standards is a 
legitimate collective concern of donors, and one where it makes 
sense to work closely with the IFIs. 
Donors should avoid micro managing the 
country aid process and provide capacity 
building and resources recipients need to 
take the lead in aid management (e.g. by 
supporting the creation of independent 
country level aid review panels). 
Donors need to design and manage the process in relation to the 
raison d’être for aid. As a general principle the balance of power 
between donor and recipient should be redressed by ceding more 
power to the latter. 
 
                                                   
18  The CDF lessons are from a summary made by Mark Lowcock , DFID Director General in an email to all 
DFID’s country offices. 
 30 
Much of what we have signalled as good practice in MICs may be equally relevant for donor practice in 
LICs, particularly the lessons learnt for effective aid in terms of investing in relationships. At the same 
time, there are also lessons for donor behaviour in MICs that we can draw on from the recent evaluation 
of the Comprehensive Development Framework where the focus was primarily on more aid dependent 
countries (World Bank 2003).  
 
6.1 Issues for further exploration 
The purpose of this paper has been to provoke discussion; we have challenged some of today’s 
conventional wisdom relating to the purpose and practice of aid. We have suggested that aid coordination 
may not necessarily be the most helpful means to supporting recipient countries in solving complex 
problems and that there may not be a direct causal link between the amount of money provided and the 
magnitude of the impact achieved. With reference to the work of DFID in Brazil we have suggested that 
quite small interventions might have disproportionately significant effects. These ideas are drawn from 
complex adaptive systems approaches to public action (Groves and Hinton 2004; Chapman 2002; Rihani 
2002) but as yet very little systematic work has been undertaken to explore the implications of such 
approaches in the aid relationship. Arguably, these kinds of approaches might be more relevant in the 
complex environment of those countries that are more integrated into the global political and economic 
system and where donor and recipient actors may be more multiplex and diverse in terms of role and 
motive.   
One way of taking forward such an exploration would be to look for answers to the following 
questions in two regions of the world with different histories and motivations for the aid relationship, for 
example Central Asia and North Africa. 
 
• Who benefits and who loses and in what circumstances from donor efforts at (internal – for 
example, Spain – as well as external) harmonisation – for example of procedures, goals, country 
analyses and aid instruments?  
• What are the implications for a region or sub-region of varying patterns of aid to different countries 
within the region? How do vertical international aid activities (health, environment, drugs etc) 
integrate with national and regional agreements and strategies? 
• How strategic are donor engagements and approaches (i.e. are donors prepared to build long-term 
relationships to tackle deep-seated problems)? How sensitive are they to local knowledge and unequal 
power relations and what difference does it make to their actions? 
• What are the comparative advantages of MDBs, other multilaterals and bilaterals, and what does this 
imply about optimal channelling of aid? 
• How important are (international and local) non-government channels for aid? How do donors 
engage with the (presumably) richer array of CSOs, academics etc in MICs?  
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• What influences donors’ decisions regarding the proportion of money and staff they allocate to a 
particular recipient country and what would be recipients’ preferences?  
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Annex A: Classifications of ‘Middle Income Countries’ 
 
Introduction 
This annex compares DAC, World Bank and HDR classifications, as they stood in 2003. Table A3 
provides full details; Table A1 highlights discrepancies between what the DAC and the World Bank may 
call ‘Middle Income Countries’, while Table A2 shows asymmetries between income and HDI rankings. 
The following explanations of the DAC’s aid recipient list and its aid definitions are taken from the 
OECD DAC website. 
 
The DAC classification of aid recipients 
This new List is still designed to capture all aid flows. However, only aid to “traditional” developing 
countries on Part I of the List counts as “official development assistance”, for which there is a long-
standing United Nations target of 0.7 per cent of donors’ gross national product. Aid to the “more 
advanced” eastern European and developing countries on Part II of the List is recorded separately as 
“official aid”. 
The List is reviewed every three years. Countries above the World Bank High Income Country 
threshold for three consecutive years will normally progress to Part II of the List. However, exceptions 
can be made, and other countries may be transferred between Parts I and II, following consideration by 
the DAC of their development and resource status. 
Thus, in DAC statistics, “developing country” means a country on Part I of the DAC List of Aid 
Recipients. Other organisations have their own definitions. The World Bank usually uses the term to refer 
to low and middle-income countries, assessed by reference to per capita GNP. This includes eastern 
European countries which are on Part II of the DAC List. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development has different income thresholds from the World Bank, and includes some territories which 
are not on the DAC List. Other organisations often have a “developing country” category of membership, 
and use the term to refer to countries in that category. 
 
DAC aid definitions 
OFFICIAL AID (OA): Flows which meet conditions of eligibility for inclusion in OFFICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (q.v.), other than the fact that the recipients are on Part II of the DAC 
List of Aid Recipients (see Recipient Countries and Territories). References to Official Development 
Assistance in this publication can be taken, mutatis mutandis, to apply to OFFICIAL AID.  
 
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA): Grants or Loans to countries and territories on 
Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are: (a) undertaken by the official 
sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at 
concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a Grant Element (q.v.) of at least 25 per cent). In addition to  
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financial flows, Technical Cooperation (q.v.) is included in aid. Grants, Loans and credits for military 
purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance 
payouts) are in general not counted.  
 
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE (ODF): Used in measuring the inflow of resources to 
recipient countries: includes (a) bilateral ODA, (b) grants and concessional and non concessional 
development lending by multilateral financial institutions, and (c) Other Official Flows for development 
purposes (including refinancing Loans) which have too low a Grant Element (q.v.) to qualify as ODA.  
 
Table A1: Discrepancies between DAC bands and World Bank MIC classification  
IDA only IDA/IBRD blend IBRD only  
“non-MICs” ‘Middle Income Countries’ 
LIC/LDC Afghanistan, Angola, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Congo DR, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, 
Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, 
Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Solomon Islands, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Togo, Uganda, Vanuatu, 
Yemen, Zambia, Armenia, 
Cameroon, Congo, Rep., Côte 
d’Ivoire, East Timor, Georgia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Kyrgyz Rep., 
Moldova, Mongolia, Nicaragua, 
Tajikistan, Vietnam, 
Azerbaijan, India, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, PNG, 
Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe 
Equatorial Guinea 
LMIC Albania, Guyana, Honduras, 
Sri Lanka, Tonga,  
Bolivia, Bosnia, Serbia, 
St Vincent,  
Algeria, Belize, China, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Fiji, Guatemala, Iran, Iraq, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
FYR Macedonia, Marshall Is, 
Micronesia, Morocco, Namibia, 
Paraguay, Peru Philippines, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Syria, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan,  
Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Russia, Ukraine 
UMIC  Dominica, Grenada, St Lucia,  Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Gabon, Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Panama, 
Venezuela, 
Antigua, Argentina, Mexico, 
Palau, Seychelles, St Kitts, 
Trinidad, Uruguay 
HIC   Korea Rep., Slovenia 
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Table A2 Asymmetries between income and HD grading 2003 
HDR 2003 has only one example (Djibouti) with a HD rating lower than its income rating , but many (listed 
below) with HD one grade higher than income. The other countries are all have matching income and HD 
grades (the diagonal shaded boxes).  
 Low HD Medium HD High HD 
LIC  Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Cambodia, Comoros, 
Equatorial Guinea, Laos, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Myanmar, Sao Tome, 
Solomon Islands, Sudan, 
Togo,. 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Congo Rep., Georgia, 
Ghana, India, Indonesia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Nicaragua, 
PNG, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam 
Ukraine 
 
MIC Djibouti   Cuba, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Argentina, 
Barbados, Mexico, 
Seychelles, St Kitts, 
Trinidad, Uruguay 
Belarus, Czech Rep, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Malta 
HIC    
 
 35 
Table A3 DAC, World Bank and HDR classifications 2003 
PRSP
Population
(millions 2001, 
from WDI)
2001
if 
different 
2003
GNI per 
capita 
(US$)
Income 
Category
IBRD 
only Blend
IDA
only HDI 
rank
Low, Medium, 
High Human 
Development
Low, Medium, 
High 
Income
PRSP or 
I-PRSP 
prepared
World Bank Lending Eligibility
 as at 14 August 2003
Human Development 
Report 2003
(same brackets for High, Middle and 
Low Income as DAC)
DAC Classification  
as at 1 January 2003
 
Afghanistan 27.2 1 NA I X NA L
Angola 13.5 1 660        I X 164 L L
Bangladesh 133.3 1 360        I X 139 M L
Benin 6.4 1 380        I X 159 L L
Bhutan 1 590        I X 136 M L
Burkina Faso 11.6 1 220        I X 173 L L
Burundi 6.9 1 100        I X 171 L L
Cambodia 12.3 1 280        I X 130 M L
Cape Verde 1 1,290     II X 103 M M
Central African Republic 3.8 1 260        I X 168 L L
Chad 7.9 1 220        I X 165 L L
Comoros 1 390        I X 134 M L
Congo, Dem.Rep. 52.4 1 90          I X 167 L L
Djibouti 1 900        II X 153 L M
Equatorial Guinea 1 NA I X 116 M L
Eritrea 4.2 1 160        I X 155 L L
Ethiopia 65.8 1 100        I X 169 L L
Gambia 1.3 1 280        I X 151 L L
Guinea 7.6 1 410        I X 157 L L
Guinea-Bissau 1.2 1 150        I X 166 L L
Haiti 8.1 1 440        I X 150 L L
Kiribati 1 810        II X NA M
Laos 5.4 1 310        I X 135 M L
Lesotho 2.1 1 470        I X 137 M L
Liberia 3.2 1 150        I X NA L
Madagascar 16.0 1 240        I X 149 M L
Malawi 10.5 1 160        I X 162 L L
Maldives 1 2,090     III X 86 M M
Mali 11.1 1 240        I X 172 L L
Mauritania 2.7 1 340        I X 154 L L
Mozambique 18.1 1 210        I X 170 L L
Myanmar 48.3 1 NA I X 131 M L
Nepal 23.6 1 230        I X 143 L L
Niger 11.2 1 170        I X 174 L L
Rwanda 8.7 1 230        I X 158 L L
Samoa 1 1,420     III X 70 M M
Sao Tome and Principe 1 290        I X 122 M L
Senegal 9.8 1 470        I X 156 L L
Sierra Leone 5.1 1 140        I X 175 L L
Solomon Islands 1 570        I X 123 M L
Somalia 9.1 1 NA I X NA L
Sudan 31.7 1 350        I X 138 M L
Tanzania 34.4 1 280        I X 160 L L
Togo 4.7 1 270        I X 141 M L
Tuvalu 1 na NA
Uganda 22.8 1 240        I X 147 L L
Vanuatu 1 1,080     II X 128 M M
Yemen 18.0 1 490        I X 148 L L
Zambia 10.3 1 330        I X 163 L L
Part I: Developing Countries and Territories
 (Official Development Assistance)
1.  Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
 
*Armenia 3.8 2 790        II X 100 M L
*Azerbaijan 8.1 2 710        I X 89 M L
Cameroon 15.2 2 560        I X 142 L L
Congo, Rep. 3.1 2 700        I X 140 M L
Côte d'Ivoire 16.4 2 610        I X 161 L L
East Timor 2 430        I X NA L
*Georgia 5.3 3 2 720        I X 88 M L
Ghana 19.7 2 270        I X 129 M L
India 1032.4 2 480        I X 127 M L
Indonesia 209.0 2 710        I X 112 M L
Kenya 30.7 2 360        I X 146 L L
Korea, Democratic Republic 22.4 2 NA L
*Kyrgyz Rep. 5.0 2 290        I X 102 M L
*Moldova 4.3 2 480        I X 108 M L
Mongolia 2.4 2 440        I X 117 M L
Nicaragua 5.2 2 NA I X 121 M L
Nigeria 129.9 2 290        I X 152 L L
Pakistan 141.5 2 410        I X 144 L L
Papua New Guinea 5.3 3 2 530        I X 132 M L
Tajikistan 6.2 2 180        I X 113 M L
*Uzbekistan 25.1 3 2 460        I X 101 M L
Viet Nam 79.5 2 430        I X 109 M L
Zimbabwe 12.8 2 NA I X 145 L L
2.  Other Low Income Countries (LICs)
 (per capita GNI <$745 in 2001)
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PRSP
Population
(millions 2001, 
from WDI)
2001
if 
different 
2003
GNI per 
capita 
(US$)
Income 
Category
IBRD 
only Blend
IDA
only HDI 
rank
Low, Medium, 
High Human 
Development
Low, Medium, 
High 
Income
PRSP or 
I-PRSP 
prepared
World Bank Lending Eligibility HDR 2003DAC Classification
 
*Albania 3.2 3 1,380     II X 95 M M
Algeria 30.8 3 1,720     III X 107 M M
Belize 3 2,960     IV X 67 M M
Bolivia 8.5 3 900        II X 114 M M
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4.1 3 1,270     II X 66 M M
China 1271.8 2 3 940        II X 104 M M
Colombia 43.0 3 1,830     III X 64 M M
Cuba 11.2 3 52 H M
Dominican Republic 8.5 3 2,320     III X 94 M M
Ecuador 12.9 3 1,450     III X 97 M M
Egypt 65.2 3 1,470     III X 120 M M
El Salvador 6.4 3 2,080     III X 105 M M
Fiji 3 2,160     III X 81 M M
Guatemala 11.7 3 1,750     III X 119 M M
Guyana 3 840        II X 92 M M
Honduras 6.6 2 3 920        II X 115 M M
Iran 64.5 3 1,710     III X 106 M M
Iraq 23.8 3 NA II X NA M
Jamaica 2.6 3 2,820     III X 78 M M
Jordan 5.0 3 1,760     III X 90 M M
*Kazakhstan 14.9 3 1,510     III X 76 M M
Macedonia (FYR) 2.0 3 1,700     III X 60 M M
Marshall Islands 3 2,350     III X NA M
Micronesia, Federated States 3 2,150     III X NA M
Morocco 29.2 3 1,190     II X 126 M M
Namibia 1.8 3 1,900     III X 124 M M
Niue 3 NA
Palestinian Administered Areas 3.1 3 98 M M
Paraguay 5.6 3 1,170     II X 84 M M
Peru 26.3 3 2,050     III X 82 M M
Philippines 78.3 3 1,020     II X 85 M M
Serbia & Montenegro 10.7 3 1,400     II X NA M
South Africa 43.2 3 2,600     III X 111 M M
Sri Lanka 18.7 3 840        II X 99 M M
St Vincent & Grenadines 3 2,820     III X 80 M M
Suriname 3 1,960     III X 77 M M
Swaziland 1.1 3 1,180     II X 133 M M
Syria 16.6 3 1,130     II X 110 M M
Thailand 61.2 3 1,980     III X 74 M M
! Tokelau 3 NA
Tonga 3 1,410     II X NA M
Tunisia 9.7 3 2,000     III X 91 M M
Turkey 66.2 4 3 2,500     III X 96 M M
*Turkmenistan 5.4 3 1,200     II X 87 M M
! Wallis and Futuna 3 NA
3.  Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs)
 (per capita GNI $746--$2975 in 2001)
 
Botswana 1.7 4 2,980     IV X 125 M M
Brazil 172.4 4 2,850     III X 65 M M
Chile 15.4 4 4,260     IV X 43 H M
Cook Islands 4 NA
Costa Rica 3.9 3 4 4,100     IV X 42 H M
Croatia 4.4 4 4,640     IV X 47 H M
Dominica 3 4 3,180     IV X 68 M M
Gabon 1.3 4 3,120     iv x 118 M M
Grenada 4 3,500     IV X 93 M M
Lebanon 4.4 4 3,990     IV X 83 M M
Malaysia 23.8 4 3,540     IV X 58 M M
Mauritius 1.2 4 3,850     IV X 62 M M
! Mayotte 4 NA
Nauru 4 NA
Panama 2.9 4 4,020     IV X 59 M M
! St Helena 4 NA
St Lucia 4 3,840     IV X 71 M M
Venezuela 24.6 4 4,090     IV X 69 M M
80          
! Anguilla 4+ NA
Antigua and Barbuda 4+ 9,390     V X 56 M M
Argentina 37.5 4+ 4,060     IV X 34 H M
Barbados 4+ 27 H M
Mexico 99.4 4 4+ 5,910     V X 55 H M
! Montserrat 4+ NA
Oman 2.5 4+ 79 M M
Palau Islands 4 4+ 7,140     V X NA M
Saudi Arabia 21.4 4+ 73 M M
Seychelles 4+ NA V X 36 H M
St Kitts and Nevis 4+ 6,370     V X 51 H M
Trinidad and Tobago 1.3 4 4+ 6,490     V X 54 H M
! Turks and Caicos Islands 4+ NA
Uruguay 3.4 4 4+ 4,370     IV X 40 H M
Bahrain 4+ 5 37 H H
4.  Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs) 
(per capita GNI $2976--9205)
4+.  Threshold for World Bank Loan Eligibility
 ($5185 in 2001)
5.  High Income Countries (HICs) 
(per capita GNI >$9206 in 2001)
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PRSP
Population
(millions 2001, 
from WDI)
2001
if 
different 
2003
GNI per 
capita 
(US$)
Income 
Category
IBRD 
only Blend
IDA
only HDI 
rank
Low, Medium, 
High Human 
Development
Low, Medium, 
High 
Income
PRSP or 
I-PRSP 
prepared
World Bank Lending Eligibility HDR 2003DAC Classification
 
*Belarus 10.0 6 1,360     II X 53 H M
*Bulgaria 8.0 6 1,790     III X 57 M M
*Czech Republic 10.2 6 5,560     V X 32 H M
*Estonia 1.4 6 4,140     IV X 41 H M
*Hungary 10.2 6 5,280     V X 38 H M
*Latvia 2.4 6 3,480     IV X 50 H M
*Lithuania 3.5 6 3,660     IV X 45 H M
*Poland 38.6 6 4,570     IV X 35 H M
*Romania 22.4 6 1,850     III X 72 M M
*Russia 144.8 6 2,140     III X 63 M M
*Slovak Republic 5.4 6 3,950     IV X 39 H M
*Ukraine 49.1 6 770        II X 75 M L
! Aruba 7 NA
Bahamas 7 49 H H
! Bermuda 7 NA
Brunei 7 31 H H
! Cayman Islands 7 NA
Chinese Taipei 7 NA
Cyprus 7 25 H H
! Falkland Islands 7 NA
! French  Polynesia 7 NA
! Gibraltar 7 NA
! Hong Kong, China 6.7 7 26 H H
Israel 6.4 7 22 H H
Korea, Republic 47.3 7 9,930     V X 30 H H
Kuwait 7 46 H H
Libya 5.4 7 61 M M
! Macao 7 NA
Malta 5 7 33 H M
! Netherlands Antilles 7 NA
! New Caledonia 7 NA
Qatar 7 44 H H
Singapore 4.1 7 28 H H
Slovenia 2.0 5 7 9,810     V X 29 H H
United Arab Emirates 3.0 7 48 H H
! Virgin Islands (UK) 7 NA
6.  Central and Eastern European Countries and New Independent 
States of the former Soviet Union (CEECs/NIS)
7.  More Advanced Developing Countries
 and Territories
Part II: Countries and Territories in Transition 
(Official Aid)
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